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I
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in the Paramount case1 brought to an end
decades of control of the motion picture industry in violation of the antitrust laws.
The subsequent decrees enjoining restrictive trade practices and ordering divorce-
ment of theaters brought radical changes to the marketing of motion pictures.
2
The question treated in this study is the extent to which these decrees brought
competition to the industry. The economic framework of the inquiry, like all
studies of industrial organization, concerns the smallest size of firm which can
achieve the economies of scale that exist at its level of production or marketing. In
motion pictures, the three levels are production (making of pictures), distribution
(marketing of pictures to exhibitors), and exhibition (operation of theaters).
In the thirty years since the Paramount decision, other major factors have had
great impact on the motion picture industry. The most significant of these is tele-
vision. Some classes of features, such as musicals, have been virtually replaced by
television programs. The sale of theatrical motion pictures to television within a
few years after first run has made television a continuous competitor for feature
film customers. It has also wiped out most of the theater market for reruns of
classic features. As the quality of films produced specifically for television has
increased over the years, competititon has provoked motion picture producers to
concentrate efforts and assets on fewer, more expensive films. These and other
competitive factors have had profound effects on the economic structure and
output of the industry which one must attempt to distinguish from the impact of
the antitrust decrees.
One result of the rivalry of television and increased public interest in other
forms of recreational activities was a sharp decline in motion picture attendance
for about fifteen years. Estimated attendance of indoor theaters dropped from
3,352 million in 19483 to 1,011 million in 19584 and to 553 million in 1967. 5
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1. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
2. See M. CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY (1960) for a review of the early
impacts of the decrees. The most recent economic survey of the industry is WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?:
CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MASS COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, ch. 5 (B. Compaigne ed.
1979).
3. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES, SUMMARY
STATISTICS 9.08 (1948).
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Thereafter, attendance began to recover. In 1972 indoor theater attendance was
estimated at 942 million, 6 and in 1979 the estimate was 1,120 million. 7 Domestic
theater admission revenues dropped from $1,245 million in 19488 to about $900
million in 19639 and then recovered to $1,082 million in 1967.10 Thereafter, reve-
nues increased, especially in the late 1970s. Admission revenues reached $1,570
million in 197211 and an estimated $2,165 million in 1977.12
II
THE PARAMOUNT DECREES
The Paramount case was a civil antitrust action against the eight major motion
picture distributors. Before the Paramount decision, the motion picture industry
was effectively controlled by five major producer-distributors who were also exhib-
itors. These were Loew's (MGM), Paramount, R.K.O., Twentieth Century-Fox
and Warner Brothers. These five companies owned chains of first-run theaters,
each of them concentrated primarily in one section of the country. Through a
broad policy of reciprocity, each of the five, as distributor, agreed to give first-run
status to the theaters of the other four. In effect, their control of exhibition was a
bottleneck on the final market. It enabled the five majors to control distribution,
production and the key personnel who were inputs to production.
Of the three minor distributors, Columbia and Universal were producer-dis-
tributors, and United Artists was only a distributor for independent producers.
Since the three owned no theaters, they had much less bargaining power than the
five majors in securing exhibition in the first-run theaters of the latter. 13
The combination fixed admission prices, clearances between runs of films, and
other marketing practices. Since the details of the conspiracy are reported else-
where,14 only the elements of the resultant decrees will be summarized here. The
decree of December 1946 prohibited the defendants as distributors from engaging
in the following practices: (1) fixing admission prices in film licenses; (2) main-
taining systems of clearances; (3) maintaining clearances between theaters not in
4. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES, SUMMARY
STATISTICS 8-16 (1958).
5. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1967 CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICES, MOTION PICTURES 4-15
(1970).
6. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES 3-14.
7. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1981 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 530.
8. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES, SUMMARY
STATISTICS 9.03 (1948).
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES, SUMMARY
STATISTICS 8-12 (1958).
10. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1967 CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICES, MOTION PICTURES 4-9
(1970).
11. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES 3-11.
12. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1977 CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES, MOTION PIC-
TURE INDUSTRY 4-15.
13. Ste M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 204-207, concluding that the three minor distributors were mostly
victims of the illegal monopoly of the five majors and that the three minor distributors should not have
been made defendants in the Paramount case.
14. Id at ch. 5.
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substantial competition; (4) continuing clearance in excess of what was "reason-
ably necessary" to protect the licensee in the run granted; (5) franchising; (6)
engaging in formula deals and master agreements; and (7) conditional block
booking.' 5 Where an exhibitor chose to license films in groups, he was to be given
the right to reject 20 percent of such films. All pooling agreements and joint inter-
ests in theaters of two defendants or a defendant and independents were ordered
terminated. 16
The district court had denied the government's plea that the five majors be
required to divorce their theaters. Instead it had ordered competitive bidding for
licensing of each film in each run to be open to all theaters. 1 7 On appeal, the
Supreme Court ordered divorcement but not competitive bidding.' 8 This was fol-
lowed by consent decrees in which each of the five firms divorced its theater circuit
and disposed of individual theaters in towns where the majors had a monopoly on
exhibition. 19 The five divorced circuits were prohibited from acquiring additional
theaters unless they established to the satisfaction of the district court that such
acquisitions would not unreasonably restrain trade.20
One significant effect of the Paramount decision was that hundreds of private
treble-damage actions were filed by exhibitors against the eight Paramount
defendants. Since others have reported on these cases 2 1 they will not be reviewed
here.
III
PRODUCTION
A. Economic Factors
The key characteristic of motion pictures is that each one is unique. Imperfect
competition in motion picture marketing begins with this underlying fact. It is not
accurate to think of all pictures on release at the same time as significant rival
services. If any picture gains good reviews and positive initial acceptance, large
segments of the public will allocate income for tickets. Instead of thinking of two
films which have received positive initial sales as rivals, the movie-going public will
allocate recreational funds to attend both. The most important factor in public
acceptance of new films in an era when television constantly offers reruns of the
15. Id at 98-99.
16. Id at 99-100.
17. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); 70 F. Supp. 53, 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
18. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 161-66 (1948).
19. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-1949 Trade Cas. 62,335 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (RKO
Consent Decree); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-1949 Trade Cas. 62,377 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (Paramount Consent Decree); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 62,765 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (Warner Consent Decree); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-1951 Trade Gas. 62,861 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (Twentieth Century-Fox Consent Decree); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1952-1953 Trade Cas.
67,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Loew's Consent Decree). Subsequent references to these decrees will be made
without reporter citation.
20. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 62,573, at 63,679 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
21. See R. CASSADY & R. CASSADY, THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS COMPE-
TITION: A MOTION-PICTURE INDUSTRY CASE ANALYSIS (1964).
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old films is novelty. The limited supply of creative writing that will appeal to
substantial segments of the viewing public is a primary factor in the declining
supply of new films.
The great uncertainties that make motion picture production more of a gamble
than a rational endeavor are clearly illustrated by Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc. In fiscal 1970 Columbia had income before taxes of $10.9 million2 2 and man-
agement was lauded. In 1971 it lost $40.7 million. 23 In 1972 the pretax loss was
only $665,000, while in 1973 it was $65 million 24 Its net worth declined to $8
million2 5 and its loans payable reached $183 million. 26 Columbia chairman Abe
Schneider and production head Mike Frankovich, Jr., were discharged. 2 7 As
Forbes reported, Columbia wrote off about $75 million in inventory losses on such
forgettable Frankovich films as Castle Keep, Lost Hor'zon, and Oklahoma Crmde12
Allen Hirschfield was hired as Columbia's new chief executive, but before his deci-
sions could have impact, fortunes changed and Columbia had three successes,
Funny Lady, Shampoo, and Tommy. Columbia reported profits from filmed
entertainment of $24.9 million in 1974, $33.2 million in 1975, $28.3 million in
1976, $30.8 million in 197729 and $80.1 million in 1978.30 Close Encounters of the
ThirdKid had total worldwide box office gross of $182 million in fiscal 1978.31 If
film rentals on this picture approximated the industry average of 45 percent of box
office gross,32 this one film earned 30 percent of Columbia's 1978 total theatrical
film rentals of $269 million. 33 The 1978 net income of $68.8 million was 101.5
percent of shareholders' equity as of the beginning of the fiscal year.3 4
More than half the pictures that are produced fail to earn rentals sufficient to
recover their production and marketing costs. In 1967 it was estimated that 75
percent failed to recover their costs. 35 Although Zorba the Greek cost $700,000 and
earned $10 million profits, 36 few low-budget films succeed. Producers, with great
uncertainty about whether the story behind the film will succeed, feel they greatly
reduce uncertainty by employing the best known and therefore the most expensive
actors. But scarcity of stars means fewer total films. The movement to fewer, more
expensive films has increased the uncertainties in film production. In 1977 it was
22. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 5.
23. Id
24. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1973 ANNUAL REPORT 9.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id at 17.
27. Onl in Hollywood, FORBES, Nov. 1, 1977, at 77.
28. Id
29. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 51, reporting earnings by oper-
ating divisions for years 1974 to 1978.
30. Id
31. Id at 12, 51.
32. See Coming Attractions." Cable TV and Videocassettes Portend Bleak Future for Theaters that Show Movies,
Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1981, at 19, col. 2.
33. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 51.
34. Id at 38, 41.
35. How a New Film Maker Alade it in Hollywood, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 16, 1967, at 189, 192. See MGM
Film Gives Small Investors a Chance to Share in Ruing Cost of Making Movies, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1981, at 21,
col. 4.
36. Id.
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reported that about twelve of the most expensive pictures would have to earn $400
million in film rentals to recover their production and marketing costs. 37 This was
equal to the film rentals of all nine leading distributors in 1971.38 The investment
is made in the hope of large returns such as the $100 million in film rentals Warner
Communications received from The Exorcist in 197439 or the $200 million in rentals
that Universal earned from Jaws in 1975.40 The effect of concentrated investment
in a few pictures per year is to aggravate the fluctuations in income.
One result from the concentration of production in fewer big-budget pictures is
that some pictures have been coproduced by two major companies. Columbia
Pictures Industries, for example, coproduced 1941 with Universal and All That
jazz with Twentieth Century-Fox. 41 In both cases the picture was distributed by
the coproducer rather than Columbia. A number of other such coproductions
have been reported. 42 These joint ventures are analogous to two major oil compa-
nies joining in a venture in oil drilling. No single firm wishes to risk such large
amounts of capital in a single uncertain venture. Joint ventures are a risk-sharing
device. Although they might result in antitrust prosecution, they are presump-
tively legal. 43
Another result of the decline in feature film output, which was only partially
offset by productions for television, was idle studio space. Paramount's Marathon
Studio in Hollywood, for example, is 52 acres of urban land with 32 stages and
1200 employees. 44 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's studios in Culver City, California,
have 24 sound stages45 on 44 acres46 while Twentieth Century-Fox has 63 acres in
Los Angeles. 4 7 Universal has the largest production facilities in the world with 420
acres and 33 sound stages. 48
In order to meet the issue of too many studios and rising urban land values,
some studios have been dismantled. Twentieth Century-Fox sold a major part of
its studio property for urban development. 49 It also negotiated unsuccessfully to
merge its remaining production facilities with MGM. 50 Columbia and Warner
agreed in 1972 to combine studio properties, and Columbia production was moved
to Warner's Burbank studio. 51 Parts of the former Columbia studios were leased
to independent producers and the rest sold for alternate uses. Warner executives
estimated that each firm would save two to three million dollars per year from
37. Is It Worth Makng Blockbuster Kltms, BUSINESS WEEK, July 11, 1977, at 36.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id
41. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 14-15.
42. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 224.
43. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), deczi'on on remand, 246 F. Supp.
917 (D. Del. 1965), ajf'dper curam, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
44. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., Form 10K Report to the SEC 29 (1977).
45. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 6.
46. Id at 16.
47. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2655, 3210 (1979).
48. Id at 3948.
49. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2818 (1973).
50. Fox-MGM Merger is Put on Ice, BROADCASTING, Feb. 1, 1971, at 47.
51. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Form 10K Report to the SEC 10 (1979).
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joint use of the Burbank studios, the largest part being labor savings. 52
The most significant impact of the Paramount decrees on motion picture pro-
duction was the great increase in the number of independent producers.5 3
Although exact figures are not available, industry sources state that a substantial
majority of films are independently produced. Since major distributors could no
longer control the channels of distribution, they lost control of their input markets.
Successful producers, directors and actors chose to form their own production com-
panies. First Artists Production Co., Ltd., for example, was organized mainly by
such actors as Paul Newman, Sidney Poitier and Barbra Streisand.54 In 1975 First
Artists had film rentals of $1.8 million, 55 and in 1980 film rentals were $10 mil-
lion.56 With output declining, the leading producer-distributors competed to lease
space to independent producers. In most cases, the distributors contributed part of
the financing for the independent producers and secured distribution rights to
their pictures.
B. Remedies Available to Independent Producers
Since independent producers were the group most obviously injured by the
conspiracy of the five majors to control the entire industry through the exhibition
markets before the Paramount decision, one would expect many treble-damage
actions by them. In one of the few reported cases, the complaint was dismissed.
5 7
Other actions may have been filed and settled and are therefore unreported.
There are only two reported decisions of actions by independents against one or
more of the five major defendants that went to trial, and one precedent-setting suit
was lost.
In Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc. ,58 the plaintiffs charged Loew's and
RKO Theaters, the two large affiliated circuits in the New York metropolitan
area, with conspiracy to exclude the majority of plaintiffs' films from first subse-
quent run between 1946 and 1951. Although the original Paramount judgment was
entered in 1945, the plaintiffs argued correctly that the same pattern of control
persisted until the final order in the case in 1950. 59 The court of appeals, by a 2-1
vote, affirmed a trial court judgment for the defendants. 60 The most important
issue was the breadth assigned to section 5 of the Clayton Act,6 1 which makes a
final judgment or decree in an antitrust action by the government prima facie
evidence against defendants in subsequent actions by injured parties. A finding of
52. Economics v. Egos: Film Firms Mull Merging Studio Fac'lities, Seeking to Cut Costs, Revive Industry, Wall
St. J., July 13, 1971, at 34, col. 1.
53. See M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 112-18.
54. See Barbra & Paul & Steve & Sydney, FORBES, Jan. 15, 1972, at 14.
55. FIRST ARTISTS PRODUCTION CO., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 3.
56. STANDARD & POORS, STANDARD CORPORATION DESCRIPTIONS 9088 (Feb. 1981).
57. Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also M. CONANT,
supra note 2, at 36-38.
58. 248 F.2d 438 (2nd Cir. 1957), afd by equally divided court, 358 U.S. 100 (1958).
59. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), afd, 339 U.S. 974
(1950).
60. 248 F.2d at 449.
61. 38 Stat. 731 (19 14 )(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1979 Supp.)).
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fact in the Paramount case had been that, in New York City, Loew's and RKO
had divided neighborhood prior runs so that there would be no competition
between them in obtaining films from the other defendants. 62 One conclusion of
law was that Loew's and RKO had conspired to monopolize and had monopolized
first neighborhood runs in New York City.63 The trial court had held that the
findings and conclusion were not evidence that there was no competition between
Loew's and RKO to obtain films from independent producers. 64 The majority of
the appeals court held that other evidence was not sufficient to justify reversal of
the trial court.6 5 Judge Clark, dissenting, said the trial courts gave the Paramount
judgment not only a niggardly construction, but one quite opposite to its intended
meaning.6 6
In Twentieth Centuy-Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn,67 Samuel Goldwyn and associ-
ated independent producers recovered $300,000 treble damages against Fox and
its National Theatres and Fox West Coast Theatres subsidiaries. The circuit
buying power of the defendants had enabled them to set fixed runs and clearances
so that a producer of outstanding pictures could not bargain for more first-run
time. It had enabled the defendants to bargain to pay significantly lower film
rentals than the market would have otherwise provided. The fact that Goldwyn
pictures were distributed by RKO, one of the Paramount defendants, was not rele-
vant when the case centered on circuit buying power of National and Fox in the
western United States, where they were dominant. This ruling recognized that the
bottleneck on first-run exhibition of the five majors was their key source of
monopoly power. Although the trial judge had ruled that the Paramount findings
could not be admitted as prima facie evidence under section 5 of the Clayton Act,
the plaintiff established the liability of all defendants for the years 1947 to 1950. 68
The court of appeals held that the exclusion of the Paramount findings had been in
error, as was the exclusion of the claims regarding the years 1935 to 1947.69 Under
section 5 of the Clayton Act, the statute of limitations was suspended from 1938 to
1950 during the litigation of the Paramount case. The case was remanded for fur-
ther proceedings on the claims for the earlier period. 70
C. Industry Self-censorship
In the period before the Paramount decrees, the Motion Picture Production
Code was also used by the major companies to reinforce their illegal cartel. 7' No
potential entrant to motion picture production could treat controversial subjects
and expect to find a national distributor. Following the Paramount decrees, the
62. United States v. Loew's Inc., No. 87-273, Finding of Fact No. 154(d) (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
63. United States v. Loew's Inc., No. 87-273, Conclusion of Law No. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
64. Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 141 F. Supp. 658, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
65. 248 F.2d at 444-45.
66. 248 F.2d at 449.
67. 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
68. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., Inc. v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 194 F. Supp. 507, 512-13 (N.D.
Cal. 1961) (citing M. CONANT, .upra note 2).
69. 328 F.2d at 220-21.
70. 1d at 226.
71. Se M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 113.
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code was greatly liberalized in 1956. In 1968 the Motion Picture Association of
America adopted a system of rating films according to their suitability for various
age groups. 72 Most persons in the industry felt there was no longer any barrier to
entry. The view of industry executives was that this limited control by the
industry would prevent more serious attempts at censorship by the states.7 3 The
American Civil Liberties Union charged that the rating code was unevenly
enforced,74 but a congressional investigation found no evidence of any discrimina-
tion against independent productions by the rating system. 75
One legal action was brought alleging that an "X", adults only, rating of a film
was a barrier to the market, and hence a group boycott. In Tropic Film Corp. v.
Paramount Pictures Corp. ,76 a preliminary injunction to eliminate the rating "X" for
the film Tropic of Cancer was denied. The court found that submission of a picture
for rating by the Rating Program of the Motion Picture Association of America
was purely voluntary even though all unsubmitted pictures were rated "X". At
least at the preliminary hearing, there was no evidence that any exhibitor had
agreed not to show the picture. It was impossible to determine if the "X" rating
would hurt or help the film's marketing. 77
D. Feature Production by Television Networks
Television networks had been licensees of older motion picture features from
their earliest days of operation. Feature films eventually became a significant por-
tion of prime-time television. In 1967 both CBS and ABC announced plans to
enter feature motion picture production. 7 Even before this, NBC had established
a program for the financing of feature pictures for its television network, but Uni-
versal Pictures had been employed to do the production. CBS, which had leased
the former Republic Pictures Corp. studio facilities since 1963, purchased the sev-
enty acre property in 1967 for $9.5 million.79 ABC established its production
jointly with a subsidiary of Cinerama, Inc., which announced an intention to open
ten branch offices in the United States.80
An immediate result of the beginning of feature film production by CBS and
ABC was a complaint to the Justice Department by the Motion Picture Associa-
72. See INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ALMANAC 36A (1981). See generally Ayer, Bates &
Herman, Sef-Censorship in the Movie Industry: An Historical Perspective on Law and Social Change, 1970 Wis. L.
REV. 791; Friedman, Motion PAture Rating System of 1968: A Constitutional Analysis of Sef-regulation by the Film
Industr, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 185 (1973); Note, Antitrust Challenge to the GGPRX Movie Rating System, 6
HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS L. REV. 545 (1971).
73. Randall, Censorship." From the Miracle to Deep Throat, in THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 432, 445
(T. Balio ed. 1976).
74. See Gumpert, Movie Industry Code is Unevenly Enforced and Causing Protests, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1969,
at 13, col. 1.
75. HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, MOVIE RATINGS AND THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCER, H. R.
REP. No. 996, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1978).
76. 319 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
77. Id at 1255.
78. See CBS Moves Into Moviemaking, BROADCASTING, Mar. 20, 1967, at 70; ABC Leaps Into Motion Pu'c-
tures, BROADCASTING, Aug. 21, 1967, at 52.
79. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 313 (1968), MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1974 (1971).
80. ABC Leaps into Motion Pictures, BROADCASTING Aug. 21, 1967, at 52.
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tion of America on behalf of the leading motion picture distributors.," Vertical
integration by television broadcasters to the feature production function was
alleged to violate the antitrust laws. The former Paramount defendants, who were
barred from integrating forward into exhibition, opposed the backward integra-
tion of certain of their best customers.8 2 In 1970 the leading distributors filed an
antitrust action against CBS and ABC which charged monopolizing and
attempting to monopolize feature film production and distribution for television.8 3
The plaintiffs also charged that the entry of defendants into production would
reverse the divorcement of exhibition for two of the firms. ABC operated the 418
theaters of the former Paramount Theater circuit and its distributor, Cinerama,
Inc., had ties to the 115-unit Pacific Theatres Corp. CBS had contracted with
National Theatres Corp., the divorced Twentieth Century-Fox circuit, to dis-
tribute its features. National had about 250 theaters at that time.
ABC responded to the lawsuit by the motion picture distributors with a $100
million counterclaim.8 4 ABC charged the plaintiffs and the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America with conspiring to monopolize feature film production and dis-
tribution. It also alleged that the plaintiffs had block-booked features in licensing
to television broadcasters. CBS followed with a similar counterclaim. 8 5
By 1972 ABC had produced thirty-nine feature films and stopped production.
Its annual reports noted that motion picture production was not profitable.8 6 CBS
produced twenty-seven feature films by the end of 1971 and also announced it was
considering termination of production 87
In 1972 ABC released one of the feature films it had produced over its own
network and the plaintiffs filed an objection with the district court where the liti-
gation was pending. 8 The judge warned ABC that it was proceeding on its own
responsibility.8 9 In 1973 ABC announced it would exhibit four of its own films on
television and the plaintiffs moved for an injunction. They asked that ABC be
prohibited from exhibiting on television any theatrical films it had produced or
financed during the pendency of the litigation. The injunction was denied.90 The
plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate probable success on the merits and possible
irreparable injury. ABC contended that it was merely integrating vertically by
internal expansion. It cited the Paramount decision for the proposition that vertical
81. Penn, Movie Producers Complain tojustce Unit of Network, National General Film Plans, Wall St. J., Oct.
5, 1967, at 32, col. 1.
82. Id
83. Penn, Movie Concemu Sue CBS, ABC on Making Fhms, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1970, at 2, col. 4.
84. See ABC Asks Damages Totalling 1100 Million Against Movie Group, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1971, at 5,
col. 3.
85. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. American Broadcasting, Cos., 501 F.2d 894, 895 (2d Cir. 1974).
86. AMERICAN BROADCASTING Cos., 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 19, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 13, 1971
ANNUAL REPORT 14.
87. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 9.
88. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 1 74,912, at
96,094 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
89. Id
90. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 74,912
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), at'd, 501 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1974).
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integration was not illegal per se.91 This follows accepted economic analysis that
vertical integration cannot by itself create economic power. The court found the
television networks to be in vigorous competition with each other. It noted the
shortage of available feature films and the uncertainties attendant in successful
television programming. Its preliminary conclusions were that the defendants had
acted without apparent intent to injure the plaintiffs, and their primary concern
was to increase the supply of motion pictures available for television exhibition.
The action of Columbia and the other producers against ABC and CBS has
not gone to trial. In April 1975 all parties agreed to suspend the action pending
disposition of subsequent lawsuits brought by the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department againt the television networks.92 In December 1974 the United States
filed complaints against ABC, CBS and NBC charging violation of sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act in producing, procuring, and distributing prime-time televi-
sion programs. 93 Only two of the five classes of acts allegedly used to monopolize
the market for prime-time television programming pertained to motion pictures.
These included: (1) controlling the prices paid by the networks for motion picture
feature films; and (2) obtaining a competitive advantage over other producers and
distributors of television programs and motion pictures.94 The remedy sought was
a prohibition on television networks showing any program, including feature films,
produced by a television network. In essence, the remedy would end vertical inte-
gration in television.
The television networks moved to dismiss the complaint, primarily on the
ground of implied immunity from antitrust law because of the pervasive regula-
tion of television by the Federal Communications Commission.9 5 Following the
holding of United States v. RCA ,96 implied immunity was not recognized by the
court. Although the FCC may consider antitrust policy in its regulatory decisions,
the Communications Act did not expressly authorize or direct the FCC to resolve
antitrust questions bearing on matters within its jurisdiction. 97
In 1978 NBC reached a settlement of the issues with the Antitrust Division and
a consent decree was approved by the district court. 98 Section 5 of the consent
decree was the most controversial since it set for ten years the hours NBC could
exhibit programs that it had produced internally. The restriction was two and
one-half hours per week during prime time, eight hours per week during daytime
hours and eleven hours per week during fringe hours. The provision did not take
91. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).
92. Warner Communications Inc., Form 10K Report to the SEC 22-23 (1978).
93. United States v. American Broadcasting Cos., No. 74-3600HP; United States v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., No. 74-3599DWW; United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D.
Cal. 1978). These suits were similar to 1972 suits against the three major networks which were dismissed
without prejudice when the government refused to turn over an investigation by the Watergate Special
Prosecution Force as to any "improper motivation" underlying the filing of these suits. See United States v.
National Broadcasting Co., 65 F.R.D. 415 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
94. United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
95. United States v. CBS Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,327 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
96. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
97. United States v. CBS Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,327 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
9. 449 F. Supp. at 1127.
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effect until similar relief was obtained against CBS and ABC in 1980. 99 Among
the other restrictions were those precluding reciprocal dealing between NBC, CBS
and ABC and a prohibition on the exclusive licensing of feature films from other
distributors. '00
Pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 0 1 the leading motion
picture distributors and leading independent television producers had filed com-
ments in opposition to the NBC consent decree. These nonnetwork suppliers of
.programming for television had objected that NBC was permitted to produce
internally two and one-half hours of prime-time programs per week while, at the
time, NBC was producing only one hour of such programs per week.'0 2 The com-
mentators had urged a total ban on NBC internal production. l0 3 Motion picture
distributors argued that NBC would increase internal productions to drive down
the price of features bought from them. Notwithstanding these objections, the
court approved the consent decree as being in the public interest. 0 4 As an inci-
dent of this litigation, the court held that CBS could not intervene formally as a
party to the proposed consent decree of NBC. 105
In January 1977 the FCC began an inquiry into the television industry that
covers almost every issue treated in the antitrust case. 10 6 This inquiry continues.
Meanwhile, in July 1979 ABC announced plans to resume feature film production
after a hiatus of seven years.' 0 7 The plan is to produce three or four theatrical
films per year. Management felt that uncertainties of the industry were less than
in the past as theater admissions have increased.
IV
DISTRIBUTION
A. Market Structure
The structure of motion picture distribution in the United States is determined
primarily by the number of pictures produced for the U.S. market and the
optimum size of firm for efficient national distribution. The Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America reported the number of new pictures released by national dis-
99. United States v. CBS Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. 1 63,594 (Consent decree, July 3, 1980); United
States v. American Broadcasting Cos. [1981-1 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 64,150 (Con-
sent decree, Nov. 14, 1980).
100. 449 F. Supp. at 1132-33.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1979 Supp.).
102. 449 F. Supp. at 1135.
103. Id. at 1135-36.
104. 449 F. Supp. at 1145.
105. CBS and five of the nonnetwork producers had petitioned to intervene as parties in order to be
able to appeal the NBC decree. The court held that the movants had failed to make a strong showing that
the United States inadequately represented their interests. Denial of these petitions was affirmed by the
court of appeals. United States v. National Broadcasting Co., Nos. 77-381, 78-1068 (C.D. Cal. June 4,
1979),af'dmem., 603 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. deniedsub nom., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 444 U.S. 991 (1979). Seejusttces Rect CBS Interventijn tn an NBC Suit, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 8,
col. 2.
106. 449 F. Supp. at 1139.
107. SeeABCPans toProduce 3or 4 Theatrical Fims a Yearfor $25 Mihh'on, Wall St. J., July 13, 1979, at 6,
col. 3.
Page 79: Autumn 1981]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
tributors as follows: 425 films by 15 firms in 1950, 233 films by 12 firms in 1960,
267 films by 22 firms in 1970, and 154 films by 16 firms in 1977.108 These figures
aggregate domestic and foreign productions, including foreign language films. In
fact, only eleven firms had effective national distribution systems in 1970.109 The
leading seven were the remaining Paramount defendants. (RKO had closed its
exchanges and left motion picture distribution in 1957. l 10) The other four
national distributors of significance were Allied Artists, Avco Embassy, Buena
Vista (Disney), and American International. The eleven leaders together released
198 films in 1970 and 114 in 1977, the share being 74 percent of total national
releases in each year."'
The charge is made that motion picture distribution is still controlled by the
seven former Paramount defendants. In 1970 they released 76 percent of the films
that earned $1 million or more in rentals, and in 1978 they released 89 percent of
these successful films. 1 12 Given the declining film production, however, entry of
new national distributors or growth of the smaller ones was unlikely. Efficient
marketing required screening rooms for exhibitors or their booking agents in each
major metropolitan area. 113 Paramount, for example, operated twenty branch
offices in the United States, one in Puerto Rico, and six in Canada for licensing
and distribution of motion pictures."l 4 To compete, other national distributors
needed similar marketing organizations. With the great increase in independent
productions, a distribution system could operate efficiently only by securing distri-
bution contracts with a significant number of independent producers. In fiscal
1973, for example, Paramount produced ten of the twenty-two pictures it distrib-
uted, and in 1974 it produced fourteen of the twenty-five pictures it distributed." 15
In 1975, however, Paramount produced only four of the twenty pictures it distrib-
uted."16 In 1976 it distributed seventeen pictures and ceased releasing information
on how many it produced."i 7
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. terminated its distribution activities entirely. It
had adopted a policy of reduced production and was not prepared to finance
independent producers to secure their distribution contracts in order to have the
critical minimum films necessary to cover the costs of an efficient national distribu-
tion system of about twenty branches."l 8 In 1973 MGM sold its seven domestic
branches and its thirty-seven overseas branches."19 It announced it would reduce
its production from approximately nineteen pictures per year to approximately
108. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 214-15.
109. Id. at 222-23.
110. M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 132.
111. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 222.
112. Id. at 223.
113. See M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 118-20.
114. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., Form 10K Report to the SEC 6 (1979).
115. GULF & WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC., 1974 ANNUAL REPORT 19.
116. GULF & WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 34.
117. GULF & WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC., 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 15.
118. See Gottschalk, MGM to Sell Studio, Give up Film Distrbution, Wall St. J. Sept. 18, 1973, at 40,
col. 1.
119. MGM, Unted Artitss Sign Distribution Pact, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1973, at 2, col. 2; MGM to Sell
Theaters Abroad for C17.5 Million to MCA, G&W Group, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1973, at 6, col. 2.
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seven. 120 The decision in part resulted from net losses on a number of pictures in
1973,121 which indicated to management that only "special," high-cost films
should be produced. MGM signed a ten-year contract with United Artists Corp.
to distribute its productions in the United States and Canada. 122 It contracted
with Cinema International Corporation to distribute its films in foreign countries
and sold its interest in thirty-five foreign theaters to that firm. 123 Cinema Interna-
tional is a joint venture of Paramount and Universal for foreign distribution with
eighty-eight branch offices in the free world.124 Thus, one sees cost structures dic-
tating joint marketing ventures of leading distributors, both domestically and
overseas.
In 1980 MGM decided to increase production substantially and determined to
reenter film distribution via acquisition. 25 In 1981 MGM purchased United Art-
ists Corp. from its parent, Transamerica Corp., for about $380 million. 26 The
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice was expected to investigate the
merger.
The Paramount decrees had one significant effect on the relative importance of
the leading distributors. Before the decrees, MGM (Loew's, Inc.), as one of the five
majors that controlled the industry, was the industry leader. It had long-term
contracts with more leading actors than any other producer-distributor. 2 7 This
enabled it to earn larger film rentals than any other distributor. In 1946, for
example, MGM had $61 million in domestic film rentals while the three minor
distributors, Columbia, Universal, and United Artists, had domestic film rentals of
$23 million to $27 million.' 28 By 1978 MGM ranked seventh in film rentals
among the seven surviving Paramount defendants. 129 It had worldwide film rentals
of $97 million in 1978, $68 million of which were domestic, 30 and, therefore, also
120. Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1973, supra note 118.
121. Id
122. Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1973, supra note 119.
123. Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1973, supra note 119.
124. Gulf& Western Industries, Inc., Form 10K Report to SEC 6 (1979). In 1977, Cinema Interna-
tional accounted for one-third of foreign rentals of all U.S. films with revenues of about $133 million. See
WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 221.
125. MGMFilm Bid to Buy UnitedArtists Marks Pushfor Fast Success, Wall St. J., May 18, 1981, at 1, col.
6; MGM Film Offers to Buy United Artists, Wall St. J., May 18, 1981, at 23, col. 1; MGM Film Signs Accord to
Acquire United Artists Corp., Wall St. J., May 22, 1981, at 14, col. 3; MGM Film Discloses Plans for Purchase of
United Artists, Financing of Movies, Wall St. J., July 7, 1981, at 8, col. 2; Holders of MGM Film Approve Moves to
Aid United Artists Bid, Wall St. J., July 28, 1981, at 34, col. 5.
126. MGM Filig Discloses Transamena Dispute Over United Artists, Wall St. J., July 30, 1981, at 36,
col. 1.
127. Cf Loew's, Inc., 20 FORTUNE 25, 104-105 (Aug. 1939)(noting that MGM had "more stars than
there are in heaven").
128. M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 46.
129. Annual reports to stockholders of the seven companies show the ranking in worldwide theatrical
film rentals in 1978 to be as follows: Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. $309.9 million (TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY-Fox FILM CORP., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 3); MCA, Inc. (Universal) $318.7 million (MCA, INC.,
1978 ANNUAL REPORT 16); Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. (Paramount) $ 287.0 million (GULF &
WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 8); Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. 269.0 million
(COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 51); Warner Communications, Inc.
$261.3 million (WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 17).
130. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2655 (1979).
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part of United Artists' $294 million worldwide rentals. 3 1 In 1978, Universal had
worldwide rentals of $318.7 million 13 2 and Columbia had $269 million.'3 3 Thus,
in a freer market, the minor distributors, who had never been part of the illegal
exhibition cartel that dictated first-run theater priorities, became equal competi-
tors with the four surviving majors. Their much larger film rentals indicate that
they were able to succeed.
B. Control by Conglomerates
The highly fluctuating income of motion picture distributors due to the uncer-
tainty of public reception of each film and the distributors' need for sources of risk
capital make film distributing corporations likely targets for control by conglom-
erate corporations. Paramount Pictures Corp. is owned by Gulf & Western Indus-
tries, Inc. Paramount's 1979 aggregate revenues of $664 million from motion
pictures, television films and foreign theaters 3 4 were only 10.2 percent of Gulf &
Western's 1979 revenues. 13 5 Universal is owned by MCA, Inc. Universal's $724
million revenues from filmed entertainment in 1978 were 64.6 percent of MCA's
revenues.' 3 6 United Artists Corp. was owned by Transamerica Corp. United Art-
ists' revenues of $462.3 million were 11.4 percent of Transamerica's revenues. 3 7
Warner Communications, Inc. had 1978 revenues from filmed entertainment of
$393 million, which was 30 percent of Warner's revenues. 138 Another 47 percent
was from recorded music and music publishing. 39
Other leading motion picture distributors have also diversified. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. reduced investment in highly uncertain motion picture dis-
tribution and made large investments in two major hotels and gambling casinos. 140
In 1980, however, motion picture production was transferred to a separate corpo-
ration, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co. 14 1 Twentieth Century-Fox diversified
into soft drink bottling, television broadcasting, film processing and record and
music publishing. 142 Its 1978 revenue from filmed entertainment of $408 million
was 66.8 percent of its total revenue. 14 3 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., was
the least diversified of the former Paramount defendants. Its 1979 revenues from
filmed entertainment were $458 million or 74.7 percent of its total revenues. 144
131. TRANSAMERICA CORP., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 35.
132. MCA, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 16.
133. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 51.
134. GULF & WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 20.
135. Id at 54.
136. See MCA, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 16.
137. See TRANSAMERICA CORP., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 30.
138. See WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 17, 78.
139. Id at 78.
140. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER INC., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 1, noting MGM revenue from filmed
entertainment was $193 million or 39.3 percent of its total revenue.
141. See METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER FILM CO., 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 2; MGMFilm Co. 's First Holders
Meeting Focuses on Roles of Kerkornan, Begelman, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1981, at 12, col. 3.
142. TWENTIETH CENTURY-Fox FILM CORP., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 32.
143. Id
144. See COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 47.
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C. Decline of Smaller Distributors
The smaller national distributors have felt the impact of declining domestic
motion picture production the most. The new, extravagant pictures usually can be
secured for distribution only if the distributor supplies millions of dollars in
financing. Marketing costs will also require millions of dollars. A small firm, with
fewer branch offices than the larger distributors and distributing only a few pic-
tures a year, risks a much larger percentage of its assets and credit on any single
picture. Avco-Embassy pictures is an example. Embassy Pictures Corp. was
acquired by Avco Corp., a large financial institution, in 1968, and in 1977 it sup-
plied only 1.2 percent of Avco's revenues. 145 In spite of the fact that Avco Corp.
can supply it with financing, it has not been successful. In 1977 Avco-Embassy
released six pictures, 46 down from fifteen in 1975.147 Its 1977 film rentals were
$19 million and its net loss was $4.3 million.' 48 In fact, its annual revenues had
declined from $34 million in 1974 and it had five straight years of net losses.' 4 9
This was in spite of the fact that in both 1977 and 1978 it had two new pictures
with over $2 million in film rentals.'50
American International Pictures, Inc., was founded in 1956 as a distributor
and expanded into production after 1960. It has offices in twenty-six cities in the
United States.' 5 ' In each of the three years, 1976 to 1978, it had $51 million in
revenues, 152 about 96 percent of which was film rentals from theaters and televi-
sion. 153 Its 1978 net profits before taxes were $2.34 million on total assets of $50.9
million and in 1979 its net loss before tax credits was $4.3 million. 54 American
International released eighteen pictures in 1977, down from twenty-eight in
1972.155 In 1977 it distributed eight of the seventy-eight total U.S. films released
with rentals of over $2 million, but in 1978 it distributed only one of the eighty-
two new films with over $2 million rentals. 156 While American International
seems to survive the great uncertainties of the industry, its return on investment is
much lower than the uncertainties warrant. This may have made it a takeover
candidate. Filmways, Inc., merged with American International on July 12,
1979.157 Filmways, with $153.4 million in revenues in 1979, received only $28.1
million from its entertainment division, primarily television films.' 58 The division
also includes motion picture production, recording studios, music publishing and
145. Motion picture revenues were $19 million and total revenues were $153.8 million. Avco CORP.,
1977 ANNUAL REPORT 2-3.
146. Id at 12.
147. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 222.
148. Avco CORP., 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 2-3.
149. Id See Avco CORP., 1976 ANNUAL REPORT 12.
150. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 220.
151. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1392 (1979).
152. Id
153. Id
154. Id
155. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 222.
156. Id at 220.
157. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2155 (1980).
158. FILMWAYS INC., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 34. See Kilmways Gets Buyerfor Unit, Loan Extension, Wall
St. J., Mar. 6, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
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other activities. Its studio in New York with two sound stages will complement the
American International distribution system.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. was formerly Monogram Pictures, a producer of
"B" grade films before the Paramount decrees. After the decrees it was able to enter
the market to distribute "A" grade films. 15 9 In 1976 it was merged with Kalvex,
Inc., and became Allied Artists Industries, Inc. 160 Of its 1977 revenues of $53.2
million, only $12.5 million was in filmed entertainment. 16 1 Excluding tax credits
for loss carryover, it had net losses in all four years-1975 to 1978.162 In the eight
years, 1970 to 1977, it distributed a total of forty-four pictures, 163 an average of
five and one-half per year. In April 1979 Allied Artists Industries filed petitions
under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act to operate under protection of
the federal court against creditor lawsuits while it tried to work out a plan to pay
its debts. 164 In February 1980 the federal judge approved the sale of Allied Artists
Pictures Corp. and its television corporations to Lorimar Productions, Inc.' 65
Allied maintained that its relatively small size and the 1976 change in the federal
income tax laws wiping out motion picture tax shelters limited its sources of funds
and spelled its doom. 166 Outsiders attributed part of Allied's trouble to lack of
competent management. 167 It is clear that Allied was below the critical minimum
size for national distribution. In 1973, for example, 86 percent of its gross revenues
were rentals on one picture, Cabaret, and in 1974, 80 percent of gross revenues were
from Papillon and 13 percent from Cabaret.16 8 In such circumstances, one or two
net-loss films could cause insolvency.
D. Distribution by Divorced Circuits
Under the Paramount decrees, the corporations succeeding to the theater circuits
of the five major producer-distributors were barred from engaging in production
or distribution of pictures without special permission of the district court. Few
such applications were filed since the theater corporations did not have the systems
of distribution centers necessary to execute successful marketing. A few applica-
tions were made for distribution by the circuits as they strove to find, and even
finance, additional film production. The first significant case was the permission
granted Stanley Warner Corp. to produce and distribute the experimental
159. See M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 128-29.
160. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1371 (1979). See Penn, Film Fade-Out: How 'Little Guy' Allied
Artists Tumbledfrom Moviemaking Role Into Chapter 11, Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, at 38, col. 1.
161. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 203.
162. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, supra note 160; Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, supra note 160.
163. WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 222.
164. See Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, supra note 160.
165. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL NEWS REPORTS, Feb. 26, 1980, at 2801. In 1979, Lorimar Productions
entered a three year contract for United Artists to distribute thirteen motion pictures which it was pro-
ducing. TRANSAMERIGA CORP., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 22; Lorimar Finds its Success in Television Doesn't Carry
Over Into Moviemakng Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1981, at 38, col. 3.
166. Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, supra note 160, at 40.
167. Id
168. Allied Artists Picture Corp., Notice of Meeting, Jan. 20, 1976, at 85.
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Cinerama pictures. 169 In 1963, as picture output declined, National General
Corp., the theater successor of Twentieth Century-Fox, was granted permission to
produce and distribute films for six years. 170  Between 1963 and 1969 National
distributed six pictures, two of which it produced itself.' 7 1 In 1969 the permission
was extended -for three years on the condition that National continue to refrain
from giving exhibition preferences to its own theaters. 172 Later in 1969 the court
approved a distribution agreement between National General and Fir'st Artists
Production Company, Ltd.' 73 National was allowed to distribute nine pictures,
three each featuring Paul Newman, Sidney Poitier, and Barbra Streisand. This
permit also was strictly conditioned to prevent preferences to National theaters in
its operating areas.
Loew's Corp. was granted permission by the district court in 1980 to engage in
motion picture production and distribution. 174 This permit to resume production
after a hiatus of twenty-eight years was strictly conditional. Loew's was prohibited
from distributing its productions to its own theaters.
E. Marketing Policies
Marketing policies of distributors have changed radically as population has
moved to the suburbs and the number of films has declined. In the period before
1960 most distributors followed the pre-1940 pattern of first run in one theater in
the central business district of cities followed by a period of clearance before mul-
tiple second runs in other neighborhoods and the suburbs. As long as each distrib-
utor made the decision individually to continue this pattern (te., without
agreement with other distributors, or without agreement with one exhibitor to
refrain from licensing to another), the practice was legal. 175 Mere conscious paral-
lelism of action, without agreement, does not violate the language of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 176 But where the owner of a drive-in theater demonstrated that
exactly the same pattern of runs and clearances as existed in a metropolitan area
before 1945 still prevailed after the Paramount decrees, this was sufficient additional
evidence to find conspiracy. 177 Since conspiracy usually must be found from cir-
cumstantial evidence, different triers of fact in two separate cases can reach oppo-
site results upon considering substantially similar evidence from the same market
area. 17
8
169. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. $ 72,767 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), at 86,761 (not reported
officially, but noted by Judge Palmieri).
170. Id
171. Id at 86,762.
172. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. 72,767 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
173. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 72,992 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
174. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. 63,662 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See Loew's Intends to
Sell Warwick Hotel, Wins Right to Make Movies, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
175. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1954).
176. Naumkeag Theatres Co. v. New England Theatres, 345 F.2d 910, 911 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 906 (1965).
177. Basic Theatres, Inc., v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 168 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
See Conant, Consciously Parallel Action in Restraint of Trade, 38 MINN. L. REV. 797 (1954).
178. See Fox West Coast Theatres Corp. v. Paradise Theatre Building Corp., 264 F.2d 602, 605 (9th
Cir. 1958).
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As central cities declined and many persons refused to enter these areas at
night, new, smaller theaters were being built in new shopping centers in the sub-
urbs. Since many of these suburbs were on opposite sides of cities and many miles
apart, it made sense for distributors to modify their release patterns to multiple
first runs. This increased the complexity of negotiating rentals since many theater
owners could argue that there was some rivalry between theaters in adjacent
suburbs.
One charge of violation of its 1951 consent decree was made against Warner
Brothers, Inc., to stop the practice of four-walling.179 Under this method, a distrib-
utor leased the theater for the period of screening a particular feature film. The
theater owner received a fixed rental payment. The distributor operated the the-
ater and set admission prices. In 1976 Warner Brothers entered a consent decree
to discontinue the practice for a period of ten years.' 80 While this enforces the
plain language of the decree, its effect may be unfortunate. A lease of one theater
for exhibiting one picture is not reentry into exhibition by Warner in any more
than a trivial sense. A vertical agreement with one customer cannot create
monopoly power, since market power must be measured horizontally. If Warner
Brothers had a higher evaluation of the earnings probabilities of a picture than did
the exhibitor, leasing the theater was a method by which the distributor could bear
the uncertainties of exhibition in the theater and reap the profits if the picture was
successful.
One of the key issues was competitive bidding by exhibitors for the first run of
pictures. In Paramount the district court mandate of competitive bidding had been
reversed by the Supreme Court when it ordered the alternative remedy of divorce-
ment of the five affiliated circuits. While one would expect distributors to adopt
competitive bidding between exhibitors in order to maximize film rentals, only a
small proportion of film licensing is subject to bidding.'8 ' One problem is that
bids may not be comparable. A dollar bid, a percentage bid, a percentage bid on
admission revenues above a stated weekly theater expense, or a percentage bid
with a guaranteed minimum rental are some of the various possibilities. There can
be comparable bids only if a distributor sets strict limits on the method of bidding.
The more important reason that few film licenses are subject to competitive bid-
ding is that the exhibitors dislike it. Film rentals are raised to their true competi-
tive price. Competition in film licensing in any city, town or section is highly
imperfect because so many theaters are owned by local circuits. Either individu-
ally or in concert with other exhibitors in their area, they refuse to engage in com-
petitive bidding. Collusion of exhibitors to allocate or to split distributors' pictures
is discussed below in the section concerning exhibition.
In those cases where competitive bidding was used and all theaters in a market
were allowed to bid, it was unlikely that any single exhibitor could show antitrust
179. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See
Warner Bros. Inc. Theater Rentals Spur US Action, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
180. Id
181. See Cassady, impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Acture Distrbution and Price Making, 31 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 150, 160-65 (1958).
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violations by distributors. As one court noted, bidding was the truly competitive
method of motion picture distribution as long as it was open to all rivals.'8 2 If
each distributor, acting independently, set his own bidding zones for theaters in a
city, no single exhibitor could legally complain that the zone system made him bid
in a run against theaters against which he would prefer not to bid. 18 3 No firm can
legally demand isolation from competition. This does not mean the volume of
antitrust litigation in the industry subsided. As reviewed in detail below, issues
relating to circuit buying power and to exhibitors' splits of the available pictures
led to large series of lawsuits.
F. Block Booking
The prohibitions in the Paramount decrees against block booking effectively
required the defendant distributors to license each film in each theater individu-
ally. There have been few charges of violation of this section of the decrees, but
one major action was brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act for block
booking of pre-1948 pictures for television exhibition. In United States v. Loew's,
Inc. ,'14 six distributors were charged with block booking successful films with infer-
ior films in licenses to television stations. The distributors were not charged with
conspiring with each other. Following the rationale of the Paramount case, the
court held that tying two or more copyrighted films in a single license was a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.1 8 5 The one reported contempt citation for block
booking took place in 1978. Twentieth Century-Fox was cited as a result of a New
York grand jury investigation in which twenty-five New England theater owners
provided evidence. 18 6 The charge was block booking The Other Side of Midnight
with Star Wars. Twentieth Century-Fox pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of
criminal contempt and was fined $25,000.18 7 The block booking occurred in only
two of the company's twenty-six film exchange areas. The company asserted that
certain employees had violated a longstanding policy of strict compliance with the
1951 decree. Its license agreements clearly state the policy.
One reported exception to the prohibition of block booking was permitted by a
district court in 1972.188 Columbia Pictures petitioned the court for permission to
block release a series of eight to twelve pictures. The "Repertory Cinema" plan
was to produce and distribute a set of pictures based on literary works or stage
productions that had received critical acclaim. Each theater would set aside two
days per month to show these films and theaters would take public subscriptions in
advance. The project was not economically feasible unless Columbia could license
182. Royster Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 268 F.2d
246, 250 (2d Cir. 1959).
183. See A.L.B. Theatre Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 355 F.2d 495, 500 (7th Cir. 1966).
184. 371 U.S. 38 (1962). See Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, in THE
SUPREME COURT REvIEW 152 (P. Kurland ed. 1963).
185. 371 U.S. 45-47.
186. See Fox Filmn Says It Faces Possible Inditments From Booking Probe, Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1978, at 10,
col. 3.
187. Fox Film is Fined J25,000 on a Charge of Forcing Black-Booking on Theaters, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
1978, at 8, col. 2.
188. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,017 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the package to individual theaters in advance. Since the concept was new and had
not been considered at the time of the Paramount decrees, the court permitted the
experimentation for one year.
V
EXHIBITION
A. Market Changes
Motion picture exhibition in theaters has changed radically in the last thirty
years. This is due mostly to demographic changes, but is in part also a result of
television competition and costs of theater operation. The great demographic
change has been the movement of population to the suburbs and the resultant
construction of suburban shopping centers with new theaters. The 1972 census
reported 12,699 theaters.'l 9 There were 11,670 theaters with payrolls, of which
8,328 were indoor and 3,342 were drive-ins.190 Of these, 37.7 percent of the indoor
theaters and 44.5 percent of the drive-ins were constructed after 1954.191 Essen-
tially all of these are in the suburbs. In 1979 the Department of Commerce esti-
mated there were 9,021 indoor theaters with 13,331 screens and 3,197 drive-ins
with 3,570 screens.' 9 2
The average indoor theater declined in size from 750 seats in 1950 to 500 seats
in 1977. I° 3 The movement to smaller theaters and multiscreens was related to the
decline in paid admissions resulting from the competition of television and other
recreational activities and to the costs of operation. In 1970 United Artists Theatre
Circuit reported it could operate a new small theater with two employees, a man-
ager-projectionist and a cashier-candy seller.' 9 4 A small theater, showing films on
first or second run in the suburbs, can avoid booking those films that have failed
on prior first runs in other areas of the state or nation and thereby reduce uncer-
tainty. Likewise, the shift to multiscreen theaters enables owners to offset low reve-
nues from a failing film in one auditorium with larger revenues of a successful film
in an adjacent auditorium. Since one projectionist serves all the screens of a mul-
tiscreen theater, there is no extra labor cost.
19 5
General Cinema Corp., with the largest chain of theaters in the country, is
illustrative of the dramatic changes in exhibition. It was incorporated in 1950 as a
developer of drive-in theaters. It has become the leading builder of multiscreen
indoor theaters in suburban shopping centers. By 1970 General Cinema had 203
theaters with 256 screens. I9 In October 1979 it had 337 theaters with 843 screens
in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia. 19 7 Its theater revenues in 1979
189. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES 3-17 (1972).
190. id
191. Id
192. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1981 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 530 (1981).
193. INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ALMANAC 30A (1981). See M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 48.
194. Movie Theater Gets Cut to Size, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 14, 1970, at 29.
195. See Edmands, Twin, Quad, andSix-Plx, BARRONS, June 28, 1971, at 11; Gottschalk, Flm Exhibitors
Face a Fnancial Cnsis As Hollywood Studios Slash Production, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1977, at 46, col. 1.
196. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 421 (1971).
197. GENERAL CINEMA CORP., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 8. The ranking of U.S. theater chains in 1977-
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were $266.5 million. General Cinema illustrates the trend away from drive-ins as
suburban land values increase and alternative indoor theaters are built in shop-
ping centers. Its number of drive-ins declined from thirty-six in 1966198 to ten in
1978.199 Little of General Cinema's growth is due to purchase of existing theaters.
In 1970 it acquired the fifteen theaters of Mann Theatre Circuit of Minneapolis. 2°°
This acquisition resulted in a divorcement action by the Justice Department,
charging violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. In 1973 a consent decree
ordered sale of ten of General's twenty-one theaters in Minneapolis. 2 01 In 1972
General Cinema purchased forty-eight indoor theaters from Loew's Corp.,20 2
twenty-one of which were sold in 1973.203
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. (unrelated to United Artists Corp.), the
second largest chain, had 835 screens and theater revenues of $223.5 million in
1980.204 It, too, has been a leader in the trend to build multiscreen theaters in
suburban shopping centers. But its one major acquisition of existing theaters had
antitrust consequences. In 1968 United Artists Theatre Circuit acquired Pruden-
tial Theatres Co., Inc., which had eighty-five theaters in New York, New Jersey,
Connecticut and Wisconsin. 20 5 In 1971 the Justice Department brought a civil
action charging United with violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 20 6 In 1976
the case was settled by a consent decree requiring United to divest twenty-three
theaters in the New York metropolitan area within five years and barring it from
acquiring any other theaters in those counties for ten years unless it obtained prior
consent of the Justice Department or approval of the court. 20 7
Another striking change in exhibition has been the growing importance of
refreshment sales. Census reports indicate such sales at 13 to 15 percent of total
theater revenues. 20 8  At drive-in theaters, food and drink sales are even more
important. Commonwealth Theatres, with 252 conventional theaters and 106
drive-ins in 1979, reported 23 percent of revenues from refreshments and miscella-
neous sales.20 9 Since these sales are in an isolated market, being made after tickets
are collected, the markups are higher than in food stores. For many exhibitors,
78, according to number of screens, is as follows: General Cinema, 791; United Artists Theatre Circuit, 712;
American Multi-Cinema, 462; Plitt Theatres, 412; Commonwealth, 347; Mann Theatres, 310; Fuqua
(Martin Theatres), 283; Kerasotes, 180; Cinemette, 160; Stewart and Everett, 138; Loew's, 127; Cablecom-
General, 125; Pacific Theatres, 125; Cobb, 125; Gulf States, 120; Cooperative Theatres of Michigan, 105.
See WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?, supra note 2, at 226.
198. Movies, Soda Pop Enable General Cinema to Grow, BARRONS, Oct. 14, 1974, at 39.
199. Movii Theaters, So]f Drzhks Prove rofitable Combo for General Cinema, BARRONS, July 10, 1978, at 32,
33.
200. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 748 (1979).
201. United States v. General Cinema Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,569 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
202. General Cinema.. King of the Flicks, BUSINESS WEEK, May 20, 1972, at 31.
203. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 748 (1979).
204. STANDARD & POOR, STANDARD CORPORATION DESCRIPTIONS 2463 (Mar. 1981).
205. MOODY'S OTC INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1522 (1980).
206. United States v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. 1 73,751 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
207. United States v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,389 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). Modification of this decree was denied in 1980. United States v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,549 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
208. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES 3-11.
209. STANDARD OTC STOCK REPORTS, MAY 9, 1980, AT 3586.
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refreshment profits are a major part of net earnings and theaters would close
without such sales. As a consequence, an exhibitor can bid for a popular film 90
percent of box office receipts above a house allowance for expenses. The large
attendance will enable him to make his main profit on refreshments.
B. Divorced Theater Circuits
The five successor corporations that had acquired the theater chains of the five
major Paramount defendants met the dynamic changes in exhibition under the dis-
advantages of the severe restrictions of the decrees. They could acquire theaters to
replace those sold but could acquire no new theaters unless they could convince
the district court that the acquisition would not unduly restrain competition.
Each petition of one of the successor theater companies to acquire one or more
theaters required a hearing before the district court and probable opposition by
attorneys from the Department of Justice. An exceptions clause in the decrees for
acquiring substantially equivalent replacements for theaters closed by one of the
five circuits was narrowly construed. Closing of an old downtown theater and
purchasing a new one in a suburban shopping center was held not to be substan-
tially equivalent. The court treated this in the same way as a net addition to the
circuit and required proof that it would not unduly restrain competition.2 10 It was
not until 1974 that the district court agreed to an exception to this rule for theaters
newly constructed by one of the five circuits. 2 1 1 And this exception did not apply
to theaters constructed by others, such as developers of shopping centers, and then
leased or sold to one of the circuits.
The series of decisions by the district court on petitions of the divorced circuits
to acquire theaters show no clear standards. 2 12 American Broadcasting Compa-
nies, owner of the former Paramount Theatres, was allowed to acquire four drive-
ins in Knoxville, Tennessee, even though it would substantially increase its market
share, because the former owners had died and ABC had made the highest bid for
the theaters. 2 13 Conversely, ABC owned only two of the twenty-two theaters in the
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, area when it was denied permission to acquire a
drive-in there. 21 4 Stanley Warner Corp. and National General Corp. were per-
mitted to buy whole circuits of thirty-seven 21 5 and thirty-one theaters, 21 6 respec-
210. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1963 Trade Gas. 70,760 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
211. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
212. See Note, Experiment in Preventive Anti- Trust." Judicial Regulation of the Motion Picture Exhibition Market
Under the Paramount Decrees, 74 YALE LJ. 1041 (1965). The number of petitions of the divorced circuits to
acquire new theaters were as follows:
1960: 10 1965: 47 1970: 30 1975: 3
1961: 15 1966: 74 1971: 25 1976: 2
1962: 13 1967: 50 1972: 12 1977: 1
1963: 11 1968: 50 1973: 32 1978: 2
1964: 27 1969: 55 1974: 26 1979: 1
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 1980-2 Trade Gas. 63,553, at 76,953 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
213. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1969 Trade Gas. 72,720 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
214. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Gas. 70,519 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
215. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. $ 70,512 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
216. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,243 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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tively. The court, in both instances, held that circuit buying power was effectively
curtailed by other provisions of the Paramount decrees requiring licensing of each
film to each theater separately.
In a leading decision, the district court permitted National General Corp.,
whose theaters were mainly in the West, to acquire a small chain of eight theaters
in New York and Rhode Island. 2 17 The government argued that the acquisition
would not only violate the standards of the decrees but also the potential competi-
tion doctrine the Supreme Court had adopted in interpreting section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The court rejected the argument. National General was not shown
to be a potential competitor in the East as a possible builder of new theaters.
Hence, its acquisition of an existing small circuit did not eliminate it as a potential
competitor. Since National had declined to one-half the number of theaters per-
mitted by the consent decree,2 18 it was allowed this expansion in large markets
with large populations marked by active competition in the exhibition field. In an
analogous case, ABC, whose Paramount Theatres group had never operated in
Sacramento, California, was permitted to acquire two dual theaters in two shop-
ping centers.2 9 As in many earlier cases, a rival circuit sought to intervene as a
party to oppose the acquisition here. Following prior precedents the court denied
intervention, holding that the Attorney General adequately represented the public
in preserving a competitive system.220
The cases demonstrate that a costly litigation process was added to any plans of
the five divorced circuits to follow the demographic trend and expand into the
suburban shopping centers. The result was that the five circuits declined as the
major central cities where most of their theaters were located decayed. By 1979
only one of the five former circuits was still operated by its original successor
corporation.
Loew's, Inc., which controlled 129 theaters in 1952221 when the consent decree
separated it from MGM, was still operating theaters in 1980. In 1959, after
divesting 17 theaters pursuant to the decree and closing unprofitable ones, it oper-
ated 111 theaters. 222 By 1978 Loew's had only 61 theaters with 127 screens. 2 23 Its
primary business was operating hotels. Its 1978 theater revenues of $47.3 million
were only 1.4 percent of its total revenues. 224
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. resulted from the 1953 merger of the
former ABC into United Paramount Theatres, Inc., the successor company that
acquired the theaters of Paramount Pictures. In 1949, the year of its consent
decree, this largest of the five major circuits had 1,424 theaters.2 25 After the spe-
cific theater divestitures ordered in the decree, it had only 534 theaters in 1957.226
217. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
218. Id at 209.
219. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
220. Id at 1102-03.
221. M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 108.
222. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2750 (1960).
223. See LO4EW'S INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 14.
224. Id
225. M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 108.
226. Id
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By the end of 1970 ABC operated only 411 theaters. 227 In 1974 the northern group
of 123 ABC theaters was sold to a newly formed firm, Plitt Theaters, Inc., for $25
million.228 H. G. Plitt, organizer of the new firm, had been a theater executive of
ABC's northern group. In 1978 ABC left the theater business as it sold the rest of
its theaters to Plitt Theaters, Inc. for about $50 million. 229 The 173 theaters oper-
ated by ABC at the end of 1977 had included 91 single screens, 79 twin screens,
and 3 triple screens. 230 By 1977 theater revenues of $81.2 million had constituted
only 5 percent of ABC's total revenues. 231 As noted, ABC has entered motion
picture production and was sued on this account by major distributors and by the
Department of Justice. Sale of its theaters eliminates one possible basis for a
holding that its entry into feature production was anticompetitive.
National General Corp., successor to the theaters of Twentieth Century-Fox,
controlled 549 theaters at the time of the 1951 consent decree. 232 After specific
divestitures, it controlled 321 theaters in 1957.233 By 1970 it had closed and dis-
posed of unprofitable theaters and reduced its total to 30 1.234 In June 1973
National General had only 240 theaters and sold all the assets of its theater busi-
ness to Mann Theatre Corp. of California for an estimated $67.5 million.2 35
RKO Theatres Corp., exhibition successor to RKO Corp., controlled 124 thea-
ters at the time of its consent decree in 1948.236 Pursuant to the decree, Howard
Hughes sold his controlling interest in RKO theaters in 1953 to Albert A. List 23 7
and the company was renamed List Industries Corp. In 1959 List Industries Corp.
was merged into Glen Alden Corp.238 By 1967 the RKO division of Glen Alden
operated only 32 theaters.239
Stanley Warner Corp., successor to Warner Bros. theater division, controlled
436 theaters at the time of the 1951 consent decree. 24 After divestitures pursuant
to the decree, it had 297 theaters in 1957.241 By 1960 it had only 225 theaters in
17 states and the District of Columbia.2 42 In August 1967 Stanley Warner had 162
theaters in 97 cities, of which 139 were indoor and 19 were drive-ins. 24 3 Theater
and television revenues declined from $40.4 million in 1960 to $38.4 million in
227. 333 F. Supp. at 1104.
228. See ABC Plans to Se/I Northern Theaters to Plitt for Cash, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1973, at 14, col. 1;
MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 83 (1973).
229. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 585 (1980). See BROADCASTING, Nov. 13, 1978, at 45; Amerncan
Broadcastig Cos. Complete the Sale of Unit, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1978, at 4.
230. ABC is Negotiating 150 Aillion Sale of Its Theater Unit, Wall St. J., March 31, 1978, at 4, col. 3.
231. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 90 (1978).
232. M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 108.
233. Id.
234. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2190 (1971).
235. See National General to Sell Theaters to Mann Theatre, Wall St. J., March 30, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
236. M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 108.
237. Id at 109.
238. See Glen Alden Holders Approve List Merger, Wall St. J., April 22, 1959, at 18, col. 3.
239. Glen Alden Corp, Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders, Nov. 20, 1967, at 39.
240. M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 108.
241. Id
242. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1391 (1961).
243. Glen Alden Corp. supra note 239, at 49.
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1967.244 In 1967 Stanley Warner Corp. was merged into Glen Alden Corp.245
Under the RKO consent decree of 1948, Glen Alden, as successor to RKO Thea-
tres, was required to secure permission of the district court to acquire Stanley
Warner.246 However there is no reported decision that such permission was
secured. Glen Alden combined its two theater groups into RKO-Stanley Warner
Theatres, Inc., and in 1971 sold this subsidiary to Cinerama Inc. for $21.5 mil-
lion.247 In 1977 Cinerama Inc. reported that its RKO-Stanley Warner circuit had
only 54 theaters.248  These and another 28 theaters held by its Cinerama Theaters
subsidiary had combined 1977 admission revenues of $34.7 million. 24 9
C. Prices and Price Policies
Theater admission prices have risen with the general inflation. Average admis-
sion prices for 1978 were $2.34 for all theaters including drive-ins25 0 and $2.40 for
indoor theaters only.251 Based on a 1967 price index of 100, the 1978 estimates
have index numbers for indoor admission prices at 194, and for drive-ins it was
203.252 While more recent data are not available for motion pictures alone, the
index for all admissions to entertainment showed prices to have risen 25.1 percent
between the end of 1977 and May 1981.253
The highly imperfect competition between pictures and the geographical dis-
tance set by distributors between theaters showing the same feature greatly limits
competition between exhibitors. Consequently, interfirm price rivalry between
exhibitors is very limited. Even without the distributor control of admission prices
which existed before the Paramount decrees, admission prices for films that are not
hits and that leave theaters largely empty do not result in admission-price cutting.
The exhibitors generally consider demand to be relatively inelastic. The question
is whether they have tested this hypothesis with price changes for films of different
quality.
D. Collusion of Exhibitors
As has been noted, the freer market for the distribution of motion pictures after
the Paramount decrees led to the adoption of competitive bidding by distributors in
some markets. The negative reactions of exhibitors, who would assume a large
part of the market uncertainties if required to bid with guaranteed minimum
rentals, led to the discontinuance of most bidding. One must conclude that circuit
244. STANLEY WARNER CORP., 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 2; STANLEY WARNER CORP., 1967 ANNUAL
REPORT 2.
245. See Glen Alden Corp., Stanley Warner Agree to Merge, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1967, at 24, col. 1; Stanley
Warner Corp., Glen Alden Corp. Boards Approve Merger Plan, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1967, at 2, col. 5.
246. Glen Alden Corp., Notice of Meeting, Nov. 21, 1967, at 40.
247. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1497 (1978).
248. CINERAMA INC., 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 22.
249. Id at 23.
250. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 493 (1980).
251. Estimated from data in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1979 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 503
(1979).
252. Id
253. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI DETAILED REPORT 27 (May 1981).
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bargaining power was sufficient to enable exhibitors to force negotiated licensing
rather than competitive bidding.
In many markets exhibitors went further and actually colluded to divide the
product of the various distributors among them. This was called a split. 254 Under
the antitrust laws one would expect division of product to be treated the same way
as division of territories. It should be illegal per se under the rule of the Addston
case. 255 The courts held otherwise.256 This type of combination was ruled to be
legal provided the distributors did not participate in the split and deny any exhib-
itor the opportunity to bid for films. The early approach of the antitrust division
was to acquiesce in this view. 25 7 The leading case upholding the legality of exhib-
itor splits of product was the Viking case, 258 which was affirmed by an equally
divided Supreme Court. Plaintiff theater owner sued the two local exhibitor cir-
cuits in Philadelphia and the six major distributors, maintaining that the division
of product denied him access to a market. The district court directed a verdict for
the defendants, and this was affirmed on appeal. The plaintiff did not argue that
all split systems were illegal, but that failure to include all exhibitors made them
illegal. Thus, his argument was that failure to include all rivals in an anticompeti-
tive scheme was the factor which made it illegal. The court found against the
plaintiff on this limited claim and, in the absence of evidence convincing the court
that the split unreasonably restricted the competitive market, the claim failed. The
court noted that the plaintiff had been able to license some pictures of each distrib-
utor in spite of the split.
The Piking precedent has caused later courts to rule for defendants in other
cases challenging splits. In Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc. 259 a summary judg-
ment against the plaintiff exhibitor was granted. Even assuming the existence of
the split and its effect of limiting competition among exhibitors, the court held it
would not have damaged the plaintiff. The admitted fact was that the plaintiff
was able to bid against any of the exhibitors in the split. The split merely reduced
the number of rivals against whom the plaintiff would have to bid. Hence, there
was no evidence in the depositions that the plaintiff was foreclosed from a competi-
tive market.
A similar ruling occurred in the grant of summary judgment in Dahl, Inc. v. Roy
Cooper Co. 260 The plaintiff had converted stores to establish an art theater. When
he subsequently bid for first-run pictures, he found that most had been allocated to
conventional theaters in a split. The evidence on discovery showed Dahl was
allowed to bid against exhibitors in the split and did obtain a few first-run films.
The court of appeals concluded, "there is no evidence that the agreement,
254. See M. CONANT, supra note 2, at 61-65.
255. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
256. Wilder Enterprises, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir. 1980).
257. Gordon, Horizontal and Vertical Restraints of Trade. The Legality of Motion ffcture Sphts Under the
Antitrust Laws, 75 YALE L. J. 239, 240 (1965).
258. Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1963), afdper
cunm, 378 U.S. 123 (1964).
259. 42 F.R.D. 267 (N.C. 1967), afdpercunarm, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denid, 390 U.S. 959
(1968).
260. 448 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 44: No. 4
PARAMOUNT DECREES RECONSIDERED
although anticompetitive in character and as such subject to complaint by the
distributors, served to exclude Dahl from the market or give it any antitrust
claim."'26 1 The court referred to the Goldwyn26 2 case, where a split of exhibitors
without consent of the distributors had been held illegal.
In the C'nema-Te 263 case of 1975, a district court held that a split agreement of
all exhibitors in an area was illegal per se. The plaintiff had been dissatisfied with
the films he got from the split and, when his financial position became untenable,
he had sold out to one of the defendants. The court distinguished the Vking case,
because the distributors were not a party to the split in this case and their solicita-
tions of bids were ignored by exhibitors. 264 The plaintiff claimed he did not
respond to the solicitations because he was afraid of reprisals by the members of
the split. Despite the finding that the split was illegal per se, the defendants"
motion for directed verdict was granted because the plaintiff failed to show that
harm was proximately caused by the violation. The court of appeals upheld the
ruling that the plaintiff had failed to show damage, but it reversed the conclusion
that the split was illegal per se.26 5 It held that conclusion was unnecessary in
deciding the case.266
In Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co. ,267 another directed verdict for
defendants was affirmed on appeal. The plaintiff, operator of three theaters in
Omaha, was never a member of the splits adopted by the defendant exhibitors in
operating fifteen theaters in the area. The plaintiff contended that the split had
caused it to be successful in licensing only the lower quality first-run films. The
evidence showed it was able to obtain 60 percent of the pictures on which it made
specific offers. The court found that in no case was a bid by plaintiff demonstrably
superior to that of the competitor who successfully licensed a picture. 268 It also
found that the distributor defendants did not acquiesce in the split and therefore
did not make the bidding process a sham. 269
The court rejected the argument that the split agreement of exhibitor defend-
ants was illegal per se, although it held it did not have to make a final decision on
the issue because plaintiffs failed to show legal injury, proximate cause and dam-
ages sufficient to get to the jury. After an extensive review of the many indirect
methods of price fixing discussed in the Socony- Vacuum 270 case, the court rejected its
application here. "Thus while it appears that price fixing may not necessarily
require a 'fixed price' or a 'fixed price range,' it is unclear whether an agreement to
reduce competitive bidding in private business activities is sufficient to be catego-
261. Id at 20.
262. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 204 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denid,
379 U.S. 880 (1964).
263. Cinema-Tex Enterprises, Inc., v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1975).
264. 414 F. Supp. at 643.
265. Cinema-Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 535 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976).
266. Id at 933.
267. 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978).
268. Id at 885.
269. Id at 887-88.
270. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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rized as price fixing and thus per se illegal."'27' This narrow view of Socony- Vacuum
was followed by a ruling that, even if price effects were not the central issue, splits
were not illegal per se. This was the rule of the Viking case.
Wilder Enterprises, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. 272 was one of the most recent
in the series of cases attacking splits. The facts were similar to the Admiral case,
and the trial court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 273 The three
defendant exhibitors in the Norfolk-Virginia Beach area admitted the existence of
the split. The court of appeals followed the standing law that an exhibitor does
not have a claim against other film exhibitors who, without distributor involve-
ment, split the films they will bid on. In this case, however, there was material
evidence that six major distributors were participants in the split. Consequently,
the court of appeals vacated the directed verdict, holding there was sufficient proof
against defendants to warrant submission of the case to a jury. It also found suffi-
cient proof of injury to be considered by a jury. Furthermore, evidence that the
plaintiff was denied first-run films by the split was a sufficient basis for a futility
theory of damages.
Critics of the decisions validating splits of available films by exhibitors have
continued to argue that division of product, like division of territories, should be
held illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 74 The avowed purpose of
splits is to end bidding in the free market for licensing of pictures. In April 1977
the antitrust division finally announced that it was reversing its earlier view and
now considered all splits illegal. 2 75 Notice to the exhibitors to cease the practice
pointed out that splits were virtually indistinguishable from bidrigging practices,
which clearly violate the antitrust laws. The Justice Department indicated that if
splits continued, it would bring prosecutions to stop the practice. The immediate
response of large exhibitors was negative. General Cinema Corp., the largest cir-
cuit in the country, said it viewed the warning with regret but would abide by the
ban.
2 7 6
While most exhibitors terminated splits in response to the warning of the anti-
trust division, some did not. In August 1977 a Virginia theater company filed suit
to challenge the government's new position on splits. The suit went to trial on May
6, 1980.277 On that same day the Justice Department filed a civil suit against
United Artists Theatre Circuit and three other exhibitors in Milwaukee charging
illegal allocation of feature films between them.2 78 While the defendants are confi-
271. 585 F.2d at 887-88.
272. Wilder Enterprises, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980).
273. 1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,886 (E.D. Va. 1979).
274. See Gordon, supra note 257.
275. Movie Industr's Di stnbuton Practices May Spark Antitrs Action, US Warns, Wall St. J., April 4,
1977, at 4, col. 2.
276. General Cinema Cntical of US Proposalto End "Split" Exhibition Pacts, Wall St. J., April 5, 1977, at 7,
col. 1.
277. Justice Agency Sues to Block Allocating of Feature Films by Theater Companies, Wall St. J., May 6, 1980,
at 21, col. 2. This action by Greenbrier Cinemas Inc., on behalf of the National Association of Theater
Owners, is unreported.
278. United States v. Capitol Services Inc., 198 1-1 Trade Cas. 63,972 (E.D. Wis. 1981). See Wall St.
J., supra note 277.
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dent that long usage will be important in sustaining their anticompetitive practice,
few disinterested observers believe there can be a successful defense.
VI
CONCLUSIONS
The unique character of each unit of input and output makes the motion pic-
ture industry one of highly imperfect competition. Within the constraints of these
product and market structures, the Paramount decrees had profound effects on the
industry. Before the decrees, the five major firms controlled the industry by virtue
of their control on first-run theaters and the system of reciprocity in access to each
other's theaters administered by their illegal cartel. After the decrees, a much freer
market was created. The Paramount defendants lost control of motion picture pro-
duction. In the freer market, the independent producer, not the studio owners,
proved to be the optimum production unit. The six remaining Paramount defend-
ants which owned studios became primarily lessors of studio space and financiers
of independent producers. On the distribution level, the Paramount decrees did not
promote the entry of significant new rivals. The concurrent rise of television and
increased public interest in other recreational activities created great competition
for motion pictures. Mediocre pictures no longer had a market, and the output of
motion pictures dropped sharply. Since the optimum domestic marketing firm
structure required approximately twenty branch offices with screening rooms and
sales forces, entry of new distributors in a declining total market was unlikely. In
fact, MGM left motion picture distribution, and minor distributors have been
merging in an effort to reach optimum size. The decrees have provoked greater
competition in marketing by barring block booking and requiring that each pic-
ture be licensed to each theater separately.
On the exhibition level, the Paramount decrees have had significant effects.
Independent exhibitors, that majority not formerly part of the illegal cartel, have
found themselves bidding for a smaller supply of films in a more competitive
market. They have sought ways to reduce the intensity of competition. One of
these is the horizontal division of product in their local markets, which is now
under attack by the Antitrust Division. The five theater circuits of the major Para-
mount defendants have been especially impaired by the decrees. As population
moved to the suburbs, they were prohibited from acquiring new theaters there
without costly legal proceedings. All five circuits contracted in size and four have
been sold to new owners. While the input side of exhibition, the licensing of films,
is now an open market, the output side does not seem highly competitive. Unique
product and geographical separation of theaters in any metropolitan area results
in little admission price rivalry between theaters.
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